Abstract. According to the outside option principle the holdup problem can be lifted by structuring the post-investment bargaining stage in such a way that the non-investing party has a binding outside option. The investor then becomes residual claimant and has the appropriate incentives to invest. Theory predicts that investments increase when noninvestors' outside options increase from a non-binding low level to a binding high level. Investments in the latter case are then equal to the socially efficient level. Further, it is also predicted that this mechanism does work when breakdown is optional (outside option game) and does not work when there is only forced breakdown of the bargaining (threat point game).
Introduction
When relation-specific investments are non-contractible underinvestment may occur because of holdup (cf. Williamson, 1985) . The theoretical contract literature proposes several solutions to overcome this problem. A general theme underlying many of these solutions is the effective restructuring of the bargaining process under which future renegotiations of the original contract will take place (cf. Aghion et al., 1994) . The essence of this restructuring is that one party is made residual claimant of the surplus created by the investment. 1 This party will then have the proper incentives to invest. 2 Examples of contractual solutions that rely on this idea include contracts that make use of hostages, and contracts that incorporate a clause that one of the parties has to pay the other party a large penalty if trade is delayed. In the context of employer-worker relationships, for instance, such clauses take the form of penalties for breach, severance pay, or pay in lieu of notice.
A simple mechanism to make the investing party residual claimant is by structuring the post-investment bargaining situation in such a way that the non-investing party has a binding outside option. In such cases it is said that the so-called outside option principle applies (cf. Binmore et al., 1989) . According to this principle the outside option of the non-investor only acts as a constraint on the equilibrium division of the surplus. The surplus up for renegotiation is divided according to the bargaining power of the parties involved, unless such a split yields the non-investing party less than its outside option. In that case the latter party obtains the value of its binding outside option and the investing party becomes residual claimant of the remaining surplus.
3
The left hand part of Figure 1 illustrates this mechanism. Players I and NI (for investor and non-investor) bargain over the division of a surplus depicted by S 1 S 1 . When NI's outside option equals w and assuming equal bargaining power, the surplus will be shared equally. In that case w has no effect on the outcome because w does not exceed the amount NI receives. If instead NI's outside option equals w', the subgame perfect outcome of the bargaining game gives player NI w' and player I the remainder of the surplus (S 1 -w'). In that case w' is binding and determines the outcome. Now consider what happens if an investment by player I increases the surplus from S 1 S 1 to S 2 S 2 . With the lower outside option w, the investment raises player I's share of the surplus by just one half of the increase of the surplus. With the higher outside option w', on the other hand, the complete increase of the surplus is added to I's payoffs. In that case, the party who bears all 1 See, for instance, the solutions proposed in Aghion et al (1994) , Hart and Moore (1988) , MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) , Malcomson (1997) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) . Chung (1991) simply assumes that one party has all the (ex post) bargaining power. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) are an exception. Their solution to holdup does not rely on ex ante manipulation of ex post bargaining power. 2 In a similar vein, the contractual status quo agreement -i.e. the outcome the parties fall back on if they cannot reach agreement during the renegotiations -can be chosen such as to give the other party the appropriate investment incentives. So, in general the contractual solutions to holdup may use two instruments to reach two investment targets. In this paper we solely focus on the first instrument that one of the parties is effectively made residual claimant, to foster this party's investment incentives. In the sequel we therefore assume that only one party invests. 3 More generally, when both parties have positive valued outside options the principle entails that each party gets the best of its outside option and the share it would obtain in the absence of outside options. costs of the investment also receives the full return of it, and therefore has the proper incentives to choose the socially efficient level of investment. By incorporating clauses like the ones discussed in our opening paragraph, initial contracts can effectively fix the value of the relevant outside option appropriately. For instance, by including into a labor contract a sufficient severance pay in case of a quit, the outside option of the worker becomes binding. This leaves the employer as residual claimant with the appropriate incentives to invest in firm-specific (human) capital.
The solutions to holdup referred to above rely crucially on the relationship between investment incentives and the outside option principle. A strong and testable prediction emerging from this relationship is that the level of investment will increase when the outside option of the non-investing party increases from a non-binding low level (such as w in Figure  1a) to a binding high level (such as w' in Figure 1a ). Moreover, in the latter case the level of investment equals the socially efficient level. These two predictions together constitute the first main hypothesis we test in this paper.
Outside options are the payoffs the bargaining parties receive when one of them unilaterally decides to quit the negotiations. Ending the negotiations is then permanent, returning is impossible. It is important to distinguish outside options from threat points (sometimes also referred to as disagreement points). Threat points determine the payoffs parties obtain during the bargaining stage as long as agreement has not been reached. Threat point payoffs are collected while bargaining continues. The difference between outside options and threat points is subtle yet important. The outside option principle only applies when the parties' alternative opportunities take the form of outside options, but not when they have the form of threat points.
In a bargaining game with threat points, subgame perfectness predicts that each party receives its threat point payoff plus a share of the surplus that remains after subtracting these threat point payoffs. The share is determined by the parties' relative bargaining power. The effect of threat points on the bargaining outcome is illustrated in the right hand part of Figure 1 . Everything is the same as in the left hand part, except that now w and w' are threat points rather than outside options. Again assuming equal bargaining power, the bargaining outcomes are given by the intersection of the solid lines (indicating the size of the surplus) and the dotted lines (indicating the fifty-fifty division of the surplus in excess of the threat point payoffs). The important thing to note here is that the investor now always receives half of the surplus created by the investment, even if player NI's threat point equals w'.
Whether real world alternative trading opportunities should be modeled as outside options or as threat points is not always clear cut, and may depend on the situation considered. In a labor market context, for instance, some authors incorporate them as threat points (e.g. Grout, 1984) , others as outside options (e.g. Malcomson and MacLeod, 1993) . According to Malcomson (1997) the former is appropriate when labor markets operate frictionless, while the latter applies in case there are costs involved when switching trading partners. The issue of what particular form alternative trading opportunities take is not restricted to labor markets, though. Also in the context of the property rights theory of the firm (cf. Hart, 1995) they have been modeled in either way. In this context the optimal division of asset ownership in general depends on how alternative opportunities are modeled. 4 From an empirical perspective both the outside option case and the threat point case are relevant situations to consider. The observation that the outside option principle applies in the former but not in the latter case yields a second strong and testable prediction: the holdup problem can be solved when the non-investing party has a binding outside option, while holdup still occurs when the non-investing party has a threat point of the same amount, rather than an outside option.
This paper reports about an experiment to test the above predictions concerning the relationship between the outside option principle and investment behavior. When this theoretical relationship is not confirmed by experimental data, contracts that crucially rely on this underlying mechanism are not very likely to solve holdup in practice. Experiments are very suitable to test the predictions of well articulated formal theories in a controlled environment that allows these observations to be unambiguously interpreted in relation to the theory (Roth 1995a) . If the experimental design complies with all the conditions set by the theory, the results of the experiment should confirm the predictions of the theory, if this theory is sound. Outside the laboratory such tests are more difficult or even impossible to obtain because of unavailability of data and difficulties to control other, possible intervening, factors (the ceteris paribus condition).
Our experiment concerns a two-stage game in which bargaining over the division of a surplus is preceded by an initial investment stage. Only the non-investing party is assumed to have an alternative opportunity. Both the case where this alternative opportunity takes the form of an outside option (outside option game) and the case where it has the form of a threat point (threat point game) are considered. Data on the outside option game are used to test our first hypothesis of whether the outside option principle works in solving holdup. Comparing these data with those obtained for the threat point game then enables an assessment of whether it works for the "right" reasons. The sessions that were run with the threat point game are thus mainly used as control sessions, in order to address our second main hypothesis. They may also 4 Early papers on the property rights theory of the firm were based on the assumption that alternative market opportunities take the form of threat points (cf. Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) . More recent papers consider the case where alternative opportunities are treated as outside options (cf. Chiu, 1998, De Meza and Lockwood 1998) . These latter papers obtain different results. be viewed of having sufficient interest of their own, though, as they may better capture the situation where the market (for alternatives) operates frictionless.
A number of previous experimental studies are related to the issues addressed in this paper. First, some papers study the outside option bargaining game in isolation. The experimental results of Binmore et al. (1989 Binmore et al. ( , 1991 indicate that subjects do in general recognize the different (from threat points) role outside options play in alternating offer bargaining.
Moreover, their results lend some support to the theoretical predictions about bargaining behavior under the outside option game. One might therefore reasonably expect that also the theoretical relationship between investment behavior and the outside option principle will appear in the laboratory. From this perspective, our focus on a setup that extends the one of Binmore et al. with an initial investment stage seems justified.
Second, a number of experimental papers already study the two-stage nested bargaining game in which parties bargain over the division of a surplus created by advance investments (e.g. Gantner et al. 1997 , Hackett 1993 , 1994 , Königstein 1997 . In all these studies the focus is mainly on how (relative) investment levels affect subjects' subsequent bargaining behavior and the ultimate division of the surplus. Generally, it is concluded that "endogeneity matters". The sunk investments made at the earlier stage do have a significant influence on bargaining behavior at the later stage, and thus the final division of the surplus. It appears that typically some concept of equity is used when subjects divide a surplus. In particular, subjects take also the (relative) investment levels into account besides their gross payoffs when bargaining over a particular division. This contradicts with subgame perfection, which predicts that sunk investments do not affect subsequent bargaining behavior. As noted, all these studies focus mainly on the "one way" influence of how different (sunk) investment levels at the investment stage affect subsequent bargaining behavior at the bargaining stage. The primary focus of this paper is the influence in the "other" direction: the influence of different bargaining situations on initial investment levels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a general description of the two-stage game model that is used in our experiment. This section also briefly summarizes the equilibrium predictions that are obtained for this model, by first looking at the bargaining stage and then considering the initial investment stage. Subsequently, Section 3 describes in more detail exactly how these two stages are framed in the experiments. It also elaborates on the parameters that were chosen, the sessions that were run, and on the specific hypotheses that were tested. Experimental results are discussed in Section 4. The final section concludes.
2
The model
Basic setup of the model
The holdup problem and the theoretical solutions to it are applicable in many different settings.
As explained in the introduction, we focus on the situation of a bilateral trade relationship in which one party invests and the other party has an alternative trading opportunity. We refer to the two parties involved as buyer and seller respectively. For ease of exposition we assume that it is the (female) buyer who makes the investment, and that it is the (male) seller who has the alternative trading opportunity. 5 The investment made by the buyer is completely relationspecific. It is also assumed to be non-contractible, so holdup may occur. Trade between the buyer and the seller is restricted to one unit. Besides trading with the buyer, the seller may also trade his single unit outside the relationship at a fixed price. This outside bid does not depend on the investment made by the buyer and may be unknown at the start of the relationship. 6 As noted, the buyer does not have an alternative opportunity. The timing of events in the standard holdup game is now as follows (cf. Malcomson, 1997) :
The standard holdup game starts with the buyer and the seller negotiating and signing a contract that governs their future relationship. Then the buyer chooses the level of (relationshipspecific) investment. After the buyer has chosen her investment the uncertainty about the outside bid of the seller is resolved and this bid becomes known to both players. In the last stage the buyer and the seller renegotiate their trade agreed upon in the contract of stage 0. These renegotiations take place under the conditions specified in this initial contract. After the renegotiations the final trade decision agreed upon determines the payoffs the players obtain.
In this paper we consider a condensed form of the standard holdup game. More specifically, we omit both stage 0 in which the buyer and the seller negotiate the initial (preinvestment) contract, and stage N where uncertainty about the seller's outside opportunities is resolved. The two-stage game that results consists of investment stage I and the bargaining stage II. (In Figure 2 these two stages are bold faced.)
The above simplifications do not affect the essence of the holdup problem and the outside option principle. First, the existence of an initial contract is not crucial for the outside option principle to apply. Rather, the driving force behind this principle is the existence of an outside option that can be reached unilaterally. An initial contract may effectively create such an outside option, but it may also already exist in the market. We assume the latter case to apply. Moreover, contractual solutions to holdup that are based on the outside option principle typically 5 This assumption is without loss of generality. We could as well assume that it is the seller who makes the investment and that the buyer has the outside trading opportunity (see also footnote 7 below). A real world example that fits the setup used in the main text concerns relationship between an employer and a worker, in which the employer invests in firm specific human capital and the worker has the opportunity to work for another (outside) employer at a fixed wage (cf. Malcomson, 1997) . Rather than the exact role of the investor (either buyer or seller), the important assumption here is that the investor has no outside opportunity. The case where (only) the investor has an alternative trading opportunity is considered experimentally in Sonnemans et al. (1999) . Both theoretical predictions and experimental results are markedly different from the ones obtained here. 6 The term outside bid is used to refer to relevant alternative trading opportunities. Depending on the bargaining game these might either have the form of an outside option or of a threat point.
entail that the original contract is always renegotiated. The contract is constructed in such a way that, given the outside options of the parties involved, it necessarily has to be renegotiated ex post. Therefore, although the initial contract is purposely designed to affect the effective outside options appropriately, conceptually the situation is not different from the one where an initial contract is absent and exogenous outside options already take these particular (effective) values.
Second, also the existence of exogenous uncertainty is not crucial for (testing) the relationship between investment incentives and the outside option principle. Theoretical models of holdup typically contain some exogenous uncertainty, if alone to justify the assumption that complete contracts cannot be written. Uncertainty also ensures that there is a potential role for renegotiation. In a deterministic environment such a role is simply lacking, because there is no reason to renegotiate an existing contract when nothing has changed. However, the theoretical relationship that is of primal interest here also holds in a deterministic environment. A clear advantage of a deterministic model is that investment behavior then cannot be guided by exogenous risk considerations. In that case investment behavior is directly connected to the expected outcome of the bargaining stage, without interference of expectations about exogenous uncertainty (cf. Oosterbeek et al., 1999) . This greatly facilitates the interpretation of the experimental results obtained.
In order to be more specific about the two-stage game that is studied here, some additional assumptions have to be made. These are summarized in Table 1 below, together with the notation employed throughout the paper.
As noted, trade is restricted to a single unit. The seller's production costs are assumed to be fixed and are normalized at zero. In Table 1 only the investment level I refers to a choice variable (of the buyer). The other quantities of interest are the basic parameters Imax, V, v, w, and α, and the costs C(I) of and returns to the investment R(I;V). Note that V represents the buyer's basic valuation when trading with the seller, and that v is the constant increment in the buyer's valuation of this trade with each unit of her investment. 7 Table 1 reveals the following simplifying assumptions. First, the absence of any exogenous uncertainty is reflected in our assumption that the net social surplus created by the investment R(I;V)-C(I) is certain, as well as by the assumption that the outside bid w for the seller's product is deterministic. Second, it is assumed that total gross surplus R(I;V) is independent of w. Third, the outside bid w is fixed and independent of the investment level I. Investment thus only affects the gross surplus R(I;V) that is obtained when the buyer and seller actually trade. This reflects our modeling assumption that the investment is completely relationspecific. Fourth, it is assumed that w<V≤R(I;V). Whatever the level of investment, trade between the buyer and the seller is always efficient (assuming that the outside bid is competitive). Fifth, our assumptions on the particular forms of R(I;V) and C(I) ensure that the 7 In the alternative case where the seller makes the investment and the buyer has the alternative trading opportunity the setup would be as follows. Let C-cI denote the seller's production costs which are decreasing in the investment I, and let B denote the buyer's fixed valuation of the seller's product. The buyer now has the alternative opportunity to buy the same product at an outside seller for a fixed price s. When we define V≡B-C, c≡v and w≡B-s it immediately follows that we arrive at the same formulation as in the main text. (Note that the assumption that trade is always efficient, i.e. w<V in the main text, then becomes s>C.) 
Equilibrium bargaining behavior
As noted in the introduction, the alternative opportunity of the seller can be modeled in two different ways. First, it can be modeled as an outside option that can be reached by the seller unilaterally. Second, it can be incorporated as a threat point payoff that the seller collects while bargaining continues. We consider both possibilities. The bargaining stage has either the form of an outside option game (OO-game), or of a threat point game (TP-game).
In the OO-game parties make alternate offers about the distribution of the joint surplus. If one party makes an offer the other party can react in three different ways: accept the offer, disagree and formulate a counteroffer in the next bargaining round, or unilaterally quit the bargaining by opting out. If a proposal is accepted the buyer and seller receive payoffs according to this proposal. If there is disagreement and a counteroffer is formulated both parties receive nothing during the round of disagreement. If one of the parties opts out, the seller receives his outside option w and the buyer receives nothing. Parties then cannot return to the bargaining table.
In the TP-game parties also alternate in making offers about the distribution of the joint surplus. The important difference is that if one party makes an offer, the other party can now only react in two different ways: accept the offer or disagree and formulate a counteroffer.
Hence, opting out unilaterally is not possible here. If a proposal is accepted the buyer and seller receive payoffs according to this proposal. If there is disagreement and a counteroffer is formulated the payoffs during the round of disagreement are w for the seller and 0 for the buyer.
Because renegotiations take place under complete information and have a finite horizon, in equilibrium agreement is reached immediately under both the OO-game and the TP-game.
But the outside option principle only applies in the OO-game. This principle entails that in equilibrium the gross surplus R(I;V) is split according to the assumed bargaining power of the agents (as given by α, cf. Table 1 ), unless such a division yields the seller less than his outside option. In that case he just obtains a share of the surplus equal to w, whereas the buyer gets the remaining part of the surplus. The outside bid thus only acts as a constraint on the equilibrium division. In the words of Binmore et al. (1989) , in the OO-game the equilibrium division equals the 'deal-me-out' solution (D-M-O). The different impact of the outside bid w in the two bargaining games is thus twofold. First, it affects the surplus under renegotiations differently. Second, under the OO-game w acts as a constraint on the equilibrium solution, whereas under the TP-game it does not. These observations are conveniently summarized in Table 2 below.
From Table 2 (and Figure 1) it can be concluded that when the TP-game applies neither the seller nor the buyer ever becomes full residual claimant to the renegotiations surplus (assuming 0<α<1). As a result, neither of them obtains the incentives to invest the socially efficient level. In contrast, when w>αR(I;V) under the OO-game the buyer gets the whole surplus over and above the outside bid w. In that case, the buyer gets the full return to her initial investment and thus the right incentives to invest. The seller, on the other hand, never becomes residual claimant under the OO-game (assuming α<1). The fact that under the outside option principle of the OOgame one of the parties may end up being residual claimant is the driving force behind the proposed contractual solutions to holdup. Next we consider the exact extent of the holdup problem under the two bargaining games.
2.3
Equilibrium investment behavior Anticipating that her equilibrium share will be given by Table 2 , the buyer determines the investment level that maximizes the payoffs she obtains. This equilibrium investment level depends on the bargaining game that applies. Table 3 summarizes the predicted investment levels for the two games. (A formal derivation of the expressions in Table 3 is relegated to Appendix A1.) Table 3 reveals that there are three relevant ranges for the outside bid w. When w is so low that the first case applies it does not put a constraint on the equilibrium division in the OOgame. In the third case where w>α [V+½v 2 ], the outside bid constraint is strictly binding and fully determines the equilibrium division under the OO-game. The remaining second case refers to the in-between situation where the outside bid is on the verge of becoming binding and constraining the equilibrium division. In this case it holds for the equilibrium level of investment 
Remark: the socially efficient investment level equals Î=½v and the thus created surplus, that the division of the surplus when the outside option is absent exactly matches this outside option (αR(I;V)=w). Note that under the OO-game the equilibrium investment of the buyer is (weakly) increasing in w. Also note that only in the third case holdup does not occur.
Under the TP-game the equilibrium level of investment is independent of the value of the outside bid. If the seller has some bargaining power (α>0), the buyer always underinvests in equilibrium. The comparative statics results summarized in Table 3 form the basis for our experimental test of the relationship between investment incentives and the outside option principle.
Experimental design and hypotheses
The design of the experiment covers two treatments, corresponding to the two bargaining games studied. As in Section 2 we continue to refer to these two treatments as the OO-game and the TP-game. In each single session only one treatment was considered. We ran two sessions per treatment, such that we had 4 sessions in total. Overall 80 subjects participated in the experiment, with 20 participants per session. The subject pool was the undergraduate student population of the University of Amsterdam. Most of them were students in economics. They earned on average 60 Dutch guilders (approximately US$ 28.5) in about two and a half hour.
In the next subsection we discuss the basic setup of each experimental session. Subsequently we describe how the bargaining and the investment stage were framed and presented to the subjects. Finally, the hypotheses that follow from our parameter choices are summarized in Subsection 3.3.
Basic setup of a session
In each session the nested bargaining game of Section 2 was repeatedly played. Specifically, each session contained 18 periods, and each single period consisted of a single play of the two stage game. All subjects thus played 18 games. Half of the 20 subjects that participated in a session were assigned the role of buyer, the remaining 10 were assigned the role of seller. Each participant kept the same role during the whole session. (These roles were communicated only after the complete instructions were read and understood.) In each single period of a session all buyers were paired anonymously to a different seller. We used a rotating scheme to ensure that the same subjects were not matched more than once during the first nine periods, and a different rotating scheme to ensure the same in the last nine periods. Within the two intervals of nine periods, the rotating schemes also ensured that a subject i was never matched with a subject j who met a subject previously matched with subject i. The subjects were explicitly informed about this matching procedure. We did this in order to rule out any reputational considerations.
The experiment was computerized. 8 Subjects started with on-screen instructions. All subjects had to answer some questions correctly before the experiment started. For example, they had to calculate the earnings of subjects for some hypothetical situations. Subjects also received a summary of the instructions on paper (see Appendix A3). The instructions and the experiment were phrased as neutral as possible; words like opponent, game, player, buyer or seller were avoided. At the start of a the first period all subjects received a message which informed them about their role. After the subjects had played 18 games, they filled out a short questionnaire. At the end of the experiment the earned experimental points were exchanged for money. Subjects were paid individually and discretely.
Our choices of particular values for the model's basic parameters I max , V, v, w and α were lead by the following considerations. First, both for symmetry and simplicity we chose α=½. The buyer and the seller thus have equal bargaining power. Second, as our main focus is on investment behavior, we allowed for enough variation in possible investment levels. Following Hackett (1993 Hackett ( , 1994 , investments could take any integer value between 0 and 100 (i.e. I max =100). Third, because we also want to establish whether holdup indeed turns out to be such a serious problem in practice as theoretically predicted, in our setup overinvestment was possible as well.
9 Specifically, all investment levels that do not lead to a direct social loss on the investment (i.e. all values of I for which R(I;V)-C(I)≥R(0;V)) were allowed for. We therefore chose v=100. Given these choices, an underinvestment of 50-x leads to the same decrease in net social surplus as an overinvestment of 50+x. The choice of V was mainly guided by the framing of the bargaining stage. As discussed in the next subsection, the bargaining stage has the form of a multiple pie bargaining game that lasts for exactly ten rounds. With v=100, a convenient choice is V=10,000. Bargaining can then easily be framed as that in each of the 10 rounds there is a base round pie of 1000, and each unit of investment increases this base round pie by 1 percent (i.e. 10 points). Indeed, in the situations where the OO-game applies we have chosen V OO =10,000. In the TP-game we have chosen V differently, viz. V TP =V OO +w. With this choice of V the joint costs of disagreement are independent of w and the same for the two bargaining treatments (for a given level of investment). From a collective viewpoint rejection of an offer is then equally harmful. This facilitates the comparison of delay of agreement under the two types of bargaining games (cf. Knez and Camerer 1995, p. 84) . Note that under the TP-game investment incentives are not affected by the value of V. Bargaining behavior is of course affected by our choice of V TP =V OO +w. The absolute pie size the buyer receives in equilibrium is now fixed and independent of w (cf. Table 2 ). In particular, it equals ½R(I;V OO ) given that α=½. An increase in the outside bid w theoretically only leads to an equivalent increase in the absolute pie size the seller receives.
From the perspective of equilibrium investment incentives there are three relevant ranges for the outside bid (cf. Table 3 ). We have chosen three values of w such that each relevant case is represented; w l =1800, w m =6800 and w h =7800. 10 The subscripts refer to low, medium and high respectively. Taken together, the parameter choices made are the following:
I max =100, V OO =10,000, V TP =10,000+w, v=100, w∈{w l ,w m ,w h }≡{1800,6800,7800} and α=½
The conversion rate used in the experiments was 1 guilder for 2500 experimental points. At the time that the experiments were run (June 1999) one guilder was about 48 dollar cents, such that 1 dollar corresponds with about 5200 points.
Like in Binmore et al. (1998) the three different values of the outside bid w were considered within one session. This was done in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the subject population. In each session we used the same ordering of w's over the 18 periods. Subjects were told how the ordering was generated (each of the three values of w had an equal chance of 1/3 in each period), but were not told ex ante what this ordering was. At the beginning of each period they were simply informed about the value of w that applied in that period. In each period all ten buyer-seller pairs were confronted with the same value of w. The fixed sequence of w's used was not ordered in an ascending or descending order like in Binmore et al. (1998) . Rather, a sequence was used in which frequent upward and downward changes in w occurred, in order to allow for additional test possibilities of comparative statics from period to period (cf. Appendix A2). The last important element common to all sessions is that we provided the subjects with an initial endowment. Subjects that were assigned the role of buyer received 60,000 points ($ 11½) at the beginning of the experiment, sellers received 10,000 points (about $1.90). We used initial endowments for two reasons. First, we wanted buyers to have already some amount to spend when they had to take their first investment decision. Otherwise, they may have felt somewhat reluctant to invest in order to avoid an immediate debt. Second, asymmetric initial endowments were needed to equalize at least somewhat the unequal (equilibrium) payoffs buyers and sellers obtain in the game. Note that unequal payoffs are unavoidable when testing the outside option principle, because this principle only works in solving holdup when it prescribes an asymmetric division of the surplus (under the standard assumption of equal bargaining power). As initial endowments may lead to undesirable wealth effects, we used the same endowments in both treatments to facilitate the comparison between them. Wealth effects then may occur, but are expected to be the same in both treatments. The actual endowments were chosen such that over both treatments buyers and sellers theoretically would earn about the same.
Note that the provision of asymmetric initial endowments may create an environment where the theory is more likely to 'work'. Typically, game theoretical predictions fare bad when they prescribe an unequal division of the surplus as the outcome of the bargaining, because in bilateral bargaining experiments subjects usually agree to divide the surplus rather equally (cf. Roth, 1995b) . The outside option principle prescribes an unequal division when the outside option binds, and is thus likely not to be supported in the lab. Asymmetric endowments may counteract the tendency to distribute the period payoffs more equally, and may therefore give the theory a better chance.
Framing of the bargaining and the investment stage
We make use of the well-known Rubinstein alternating offer bargaining game in framing the bargaining stage. Instead of working with a single pie that shrinks over time by some discount factor, we use a multiple pie framework in which the pie vanishes in each round of disagreement.
11 The costs of delay of agreement are thus not modeled in terms of discounting, but rather in terms of foregone trade opportunities (cf. Bolton and Whinston, 1993 , see also Chiu, 1998, p. 893 and MacLeod and Malcomson,1993) . A practical advantage of the multiple pie framework is that when the first mover and the length of the bargaining game are appropriately chosen, the equilibrium proposal strategy of the first mover is stationary even in the TP-game. In that case the theoretical S-T-D solution exactly applies, because there is no first mover (dis)advantage. In contrast, in a single pie model of fixed length (with discounting) the proposal strategy of the first mover in the TP-game is necessarily non-stationary and strongly dependent on the length of the bargaining game. The S-T-D solution then only applies in the limit when the discount factor approaches (but does not become equal to) one. A second important characteristic of our framing is that the bargaining stage is of fixed and finite length. In contrast, a number of papers use random ending of the bargaining process (Binmore et al. 1991 , Hackett 1993 , 1994 , and Kahn and Murnighan 1993 . But as Binmore et al. (1991) note, subjects may have great difficulties in understanding the implications of stochastic ending. This led them to fix the number of bargaining rounds in advance. Another, more fundamental problem with the stochastic formulation is that the commitment to stick to the same (high) probabilities of continuing the bargaining game is not credible after a large number of rounds have elapsed (cf. note 14 on p. 369 in Hackett, 1994) .
The general characteristics of our bargaining stage that apply to both the OO-game and the TP-game can be described as follows. First, the bargaining stage consists of exactly 10 rounds. Second, in each of these ten rounds there is a pie to be divided between the buyer and the seller. The size of the round-pies equals R(I;V)/10. That is, the gross surplus R(I;V) that is obtained when the buyer and the seller immediately reach agreement is spread evenly over the ten bargaining rounds. Third, the buyer and the seller alternate in making offers of how to split the ten round-pies. The buyer always makes the proposal in the first round. Hence in all odd rounds she formulates the proposal, while in all even rounds the seller gets the opportunity to make a proposal. Fourth, as soon as agreement is reached the pie of the current round, as well as the pies of all remaining rounds, are divided according to the proposal agreed upon. For example, if the buyer and seller agree on an equal split in round 3, all the eight pies from round 3 and onwards till round 10 are divided equally. In case the buyer and the seller have not reached 11 Experimental studies that use the Rubinstein alternating offer bargaining game typically employ the single pie framework. See, for instance, Binmore et al. (1989 Binmore et al. ( , 1991 , Bolton (1991) , Hackett (1993 Hackett ( , 1994 , Kahn and Murnighan (1993) , Neelin et al. (1988) , and Ochs and Roth (1989) . Oosterbeek et al. (1999) are an exception. They use the same multiple pie framework as is used here. agreement before or in the final period (and they also did not choose to break off the negotiations in the OO-game), the bargaining ends and both agents get nothing. This is referred to as forced breakdown.
As explained in Section 2, the OO-game and the TP-game differ in the possible responses to a proposal, and in the payoffs associated with these responses. In short, under the OO-game the negotiations over the division of the surplus takes the form of alternating offer bargaining with threat points (0,0) and outside options (0,w). Here the first entry refers to the payoff to the buyer and the second to the payoff of the seller. The TP-game corresponds to alternating offer bargaining in which the threat points equal (0,w) and where possibilities for optional breakdown are absent. With the total surplus divided in 10 equally sized round-pies, the threat point and outside options are also divided into 10 pieces. Hence, in the TP-game the seller receives w/10 for every round that agreement is postponed. In the OO-game, opting out in round r results in a payoff for the seller equal to (11-r)w/10. In that case the buyer receives nothing.
In the subgame perfect equilibria of both bargaining games agreement is reached immediately in the first round. For every investment level chosen, the equilibrium division of the gross surplus R(I;V) follows from the formulae presented in Table 2 . Using backwards induction the following equilibrium strategies can be obtained (cf. Sloof, 1999) . Here s t and s t+1 refer to the relative share of the remaining pies the buyer gets according to the proposal made, with s t the equilibrium proposal done by the buyer and s t+1 an equilibrium proposal made by the seller (for t=1,3,5,7,9).
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OO-game: s t =min{½, 1-w/R(I;V OO )} and s t+1 =(9-t)/(10-t)⋅min{½, 1-w/R(I;V OO )} TP-game: s t =½(1-w/R(I;V TP )) and s t+1 =(9-t)/(10-t)⋅½(1-w/R(I;V TP ))
On the equilibrium path these proposals are accepted, as well as proposals that give the deciding party more. Proposals that give the opponent less are always rejected. Finally we discuss the framing of the investment stage. At the beginning of each period subjects were informed about both the size of the base round pie and the value of the outside bid w. In the OO-game the size of the base round pie equaled 1000 experimental points, in the TPgame it was equal to (1000+w/10). (Recall that within one period all ten pairs were confronted with the same value of w, and thus with the same base round-pie.) Subsequently, the buyer was asked how much she wanted to add to the base round pie. Thus, instead of choosing the investment level I directly, buyers in effect chose the amount 10*I (note that vI/10=10*I). For 12 Strictly speaking, these formulae represent the equilibrium proposals for the continuous versions of the two bargaining games. Of course, in the experiment we necessarily have to work with a positive smallest unit (which is 1 experimental point in our case). Because in our experiment this smallest unit is very small compared to the joint cost of a one round delay (1000 points), we do not run into serious multiple equilibria problems as described in Van Damme et al. (1990) . In particular, it can be shown that for every level of investment chosen, the discrete versions of the two bargaining games have only at most two equilibrium outcomes. One of them always corresponds exactly with the equilibrium outcome of the continuous case as given by s 1 , while the other equilibrium outcome (when it exists) gives the seller one experimental point on top of the amount prescribed by s 1 . Equilibrium investment behavior is not seriously affected by the existence of this second equilibrium outcome. In the discrete case only investment levels that lie within one unit of investment of the equilibrium level in the continuous case may be sustainable as equilibrium level. could be read directly from a table that was handed out to all subjects (thus also to sellers). The size of the actual round pies was then set at the sum of the base round pie and the amount 10*I chosen in the first stage. The game then continued to the second stage in which the two subjects bargained over the division of the ten actual round pies, as described above.
3.3
Hypotheses Equilibrium predictions based on subgame perfection for the two treatments are summarized in Table 4 . In this table the bargaining outcome is stated as the share the buyer (as investor) obtains in equilibrium.
The predictions in Table 4 lead to hypotheses regarding investment behavior and bargaining behavior. With respect to investment behavior we formulate hypotheses based on comparative statics predictions and hypotheses based on point predictions.
Investment behavior
• Under the OO-game, investment levels increase with the value of w.
• Under the TP game, investment levels are independent of w.
• Under the OO-game, investment levels are equal to 25 when w=w l , 36 when w=w m and 50 when w=w h . In particular, there is no holdup when w is strictly binding (w=w h ).
• Under the TP-game, investment levels equal 25 for all w. Holdup occurs independent of w.
Bargaining behavior
• Under the OO-game, the buyer receives half of the return on her investment when the outside bid is non-binding.
• Under the OO-game, the buyer receives the full return on her investment when the outside bid is binding.
• Under the TP-game, the buyer always receives half of the return on her investment.
• There is no delay of agreement.
4
Experimental results The presentation of the experimental results is divided into two subsections which deal respectively with investment behavior and bargaining behavior. Actual investment behavior did not vary significantly between the different sessions of the same treatment.
13 Therefore, we have pooled the observations from the sessions that considered the same bargaining game. Evidence for this result is obtained from Table 5 , which reports average investment levels by bargaining game and outside bid. Each investor makes 18 investment decisions. These investment decisions are divided equally over the three possible values w l , w m and w h . For each value of w considered we thus can calculate individual mean investment levels based on six observations. The overall mean over the 20 investors are then based on 20 of such individual mean values. Alternatively, we can consider each investment decision as a separate observation. The mean value is necessarily equal to the mean investment level based on mean values per investor. But the number of observations and the standard deviations are different. This allows us to run tests at these two different levels of observation, i.e. at the investor level and at the investment decision level (notice that with data at the investment decision level, observations are not independent).
Investment behavior
Within a column we compare investment levels from the same investors for different levels of w. This controls for unobserved heterogeneity within the subject population. For the OO-game, tests both at the investor level (Wilcoxon sign-rank test for matched pairs) and at the investment decision level (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test) do not reject the hypothesis of equality of the investment levels for different values of the outside option.
Results for the TP-game are less clear cut and suggest some variation of investment levels with the value of the threat point. When tested at the investor level, subjects do significantly increase their investments in case the threat point rises from w l to w m . But investment levels do not significantly change when going from w m to w h , or even when going from w l to w h . In case separate investment decisions are taken as the unit of observation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that investment levels are equal for all three different values of the threat point.
These comparative statics results differ from theoretical predictions (cf. Table 5 ).
Especially for the OO-game the contrast between observed and predicted investment behavior is 13 Six Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests are performed to compare mean individual investment levels conditional on the value of w. No significant differences between similar sessions are found at the 5% level. very sharp. For this treatment it is observed that investment levels remain the same when the outside option goes up, while it is predicted that they should rise. With respect to the TP-game, comparative statics predictions receive mixed support from the data. In this treatment we observe some variation in investment levels between different levels of w, while it is predicted that they are constant. Further evidence that buyers do not respond to changes in the outside bid in accordance with the subgame perfect predictions can be obtained from analyzing the period to period changes of individual investment levels (cf. Appendix A2). Each buyer makes 18 investment decisions. Hence, for each individual buyer we observe 17 (potential) changes in the investment level chosen. Depending on the outside bid in two adjacent periods, we then predict that the investment level will increase, decrease or remain the same (cf. Table 4 ). These predictions can be confronted with the actually observed changes. The results in Table A2 reveal that in most cases a majority of the buyers do not adjust their investment level in the direction predicted.
Our second result concerns absolute investment levels.
Result 2: In all treatments average investment levels are below the socially efficient level. But they are typically above the level predicted by subgame perfection. The single case where buyers invest on average less than predicted is when holdup is expected not to occur (OO-game with w=w h ).
Result 2 follows immediately from comparing the realized mean investment levels with the theoretically predicted levels (cf. Table 5 ). More detailed information regarding investment levels is given in Figures 3a through 3d below. These figures show plots of the distribution of investment levels by treatment and the seller's outside bid. Again the cases of investor level data (Figures 3a and 3b ) and investment decision level data (cf. Figures 3c and 3d ) are depicted. In these figures the line in the middle of the boxes gives the mean, while the upper and lower side of the boxes are located one standard deviation from the mean. The lines connected to the boxes extend to the largest and smallest data point observed. The general picture that emerges from these figures is the same. In all cases (i.e. bargaining treatment-outside bid combinations) a vast majority of the investment levels falls short of the socially optimum level of 50. Indeed, when we consider the data at the level of investment decisions, 69% of the 720 observed decisions resulted in underinvestment. 21% of the investments were exactly at the efficient level. Only a small minority of observed investment decisions (10%) is above that socially efficient level. For these latter cases the mean investment rate is 65.6. Although over-investment thus may occur -and from a collective viewpoint is equally unattractive as underinvestment in our symmetric setup (cf. Subsection 3.1) -it does not seem to pose a serious problem in practice. To the contrary, our data confirm the theoretical prediction that holdup (underinvestment) is indeed the real problem to consider. Again looking at the level of investment decisions, of the 720 investment levels observed only 43 (6%) coincide with the theoretically predicted level. Buyers typically overinvest from an individually rational point of view. Similar conclusions are obtained when we focus at the investor level data.
Our final result regarding investment behavior compares investment levels under the two bargaining regimes.
Result 3: Investment levels are higher under the OO-game than under the TP-game.
Support for Result 3 is again provided in Table 5 . For given levels of the outside bid, the average investment levels are higher under the OO-game than under the TP-game. This difference is not significant when we make comparisons at the investor level, but is always significant when we make comparisons at the level of investment decisions. When we aggregate investment levels over all three outside bid levels, the difference between average investment levels under both games is also significant at the investor level.
14 From Results 2 and 3 together it immediately follows that observed efficiency losses due to suboptimal investment are smaller under the OO-game than under the TP-game. This does not only apply for outside bids equal to w m or w h as theory predicts, but also for a low value of the outside bid (w=w l ).
The results presented in this subsection reveal that the main predictions concerning the relationship between the outside option principle and investment behavior are not supported by the data. Under the OO-game investment levels do not respond to changes in the outside option (Result 1), and underinvestment still occurs when the seller's outside option is binding (Result 2). But, underinvestment is less severe than theory predicts (Result 2). In line with theoretical predictions, investment levels indeed tend to be higher under the OO-game than under the TPgame when the outside bid is binding (Result 3). But, in contrast to theory, this also holds when w is low (w=w l ) and the outside bid does not bind. In the next subsection we turn to the analysis of actual bargaining behavior, in order to see whether the deviations between predicted and realized investment levels can be explained by features of observed bargaining behavior.
4.2
Bargaining behavior The main question of this subsection is whether actually observed bargaining behavior can provide an explanation for the divergent investment levels of the previous subsection. While the private costs of investment are certain to the buyer, the actual private return on this investment is not. The actual return depends on the bargaining outcome in stage 2. Specifically, the return the buyer obtains from her investment is completely determined by the offers finally accepted, the number of bargaining rounds required to reach agreement, and by the rates of disagreement and opting out (in the OO-game). Theory predicts immediate agreement in round one, and also provides clear cut predictions about the equilibrium share the buyer obtains (cf. Subsection 3.3). We therefore start with presenting results on buyers' first offers, before turning to the finally accepted offers. Then we consider the frequency of disagreement and the number of rounds required to reach agreement. As will be seen below, actual bargaining outcomes differ substantially from theoretical predictions. At the end of this subsection we therefore address the question whether observed investment levels can be considered optimal (from the selfish point of view of the buyer), given this actual bargaining behavior.
Although our main interest in this subsection lies in explaining observed investment behavior from observed bargaining behavior, at some instances we direct our attention at describing observed bargaining behavior itself. In particular, we then focus on the issue of how considerations of fairness might provide an explanation for the aberrant bargaining behavior observed.
Our first result in this subsection relates to buyers' first offers.
Result 4: When the seller's outside bid is binding, buyers' first offers are in line with theoretical predictions. When the seller's outside bid is non-binding, first offers are too responsive to the level of investment, and in case of the OO-game also too responsive to the outside bid. Under the TP-game first offers are not responsive enough to the outside bid.
Evidence for Result 4 is given in Table 6 , which contains results from regressing buyers' first offers on the level of investment and the outside bid for different bargaining situations.
15 Three bargaining situations are distinguished: the OO-game with a binding outside bid (i.e. w≥½(V OO +vI)), the OO-game with a non-binding outside bid (i.e. w<½(V OO +vI)), and the TP-
game. The first two columns give the expressions for the D-M-O and the S-T-D prediction
; the theoretically predicted expressions are bold faced. 16 The estimated coefficients are reported in the third column. The fourth column reports the number of observations, the last column the adjusted R squared of the estimated equation. The first row relates to the results for the OO-game with a binding outside bid. Here the outside option principle predicts that the seller just receives his outside bid. The buyer then becomes residual claimant and receives the full returns on the investment. The estimation results show that on average buyers' first offers are in line with this prediction. The outside bid comes in with a coefficient (almost) equal to minus one and the buyers' investment has a coefficient (almost) equal to one.
The theoretical predictions fare less well in the other two cases. In the OO-game with a non-binding outside bid (second row), the first offer is significantly negatively affected by the outside bid where theory predicts this offer to be independent of w. In her first offer the buyer also claims the full return to her investment, while theory predicts that she would ask for only half of it. In the TP-game, on the other hand, the buyer seems to be prepared to share the returns to the investment (almost) equally with the seller, but now she does put too low a weight on the seller's outside bid. In fact, while under the TP-game S-T-D is the predicted outcome, buyers'
15 Similar conclusions as in Result 4 (and in Result 5 below) are obtained when we estimate regression equations for each of the three values of the outside bid separately. In that case we regress first offers on the investment level and a constant term, distinguishing for each value of w the three situations considered in Table 6 . 16 For the predicted levels of investment, the OO-binding situation applies for both w=w m and w h , and the OO-nonbinding situation for w=w l . As the actually observed investment levels differ substantially from theoretical predictions, this correspondence does not apply for our experimental data. But, even when investment levels differ from their equilibrium predictions, subgame perfection predicts that in the bargaining stage the first offer under the OO-game (TP-game) is given by D-M-O (S-T-D). Figures 3 and 4) for the TP-game. These authors also observed that this was no longer the case when the outside bid is binding. In our setup the latter situation is never observed under the TP-game.
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Pooled regression results (not reported) indicate that the coefficient for V is significantly (at the 5%-level) higher in the OO-game with binding outside option than in the other two situations. The coefficient for vI is significantly lower in the TP-game than in the two regimes of the OO-game. The three coefficients for the outside bid in Table 6 all differ significantly from each other (again at the 5%-level).
The next result refers to the share buyers receive according to the finally accepted offers. Because not all observed bargaining outcomes end in agreement, this result only refers to the payoffs buyers obtain from the bargaining conditional on agreement.
Result 5: When the outside bid is binding (non-binding) the finally accepted offer gives the buyer a smaller (larger) return on her investment than predicted. In the OO-game with a nonbinding outside bid there is an unpredicted negative impact of the seller's outside bid on the share the buyer gets according to the finally accepted offer. In the other two cases the effect of the outside bid is smaller than predicted.
This result follows from the regression results reported in Table 7 . Here we have regressed the amount the buyer received according to the finally accepted offer on the level of investment and the outside bid. The observations in which no agreement was eventually reached, i.e. those where the seller actually opted out in the OO-game (39 observations) and those for which there was permanent disagreement in the TP-game (4 observations), were left out from the 17 This observation not only follows from Table 6 , but also from Table 8a below that presents (among other things) the mean of actual first offers under the TP-game in relation to the D-M-O and S-T-D predictions. 18 Owing to our construction that V TP =V OO +w and our assumption that w<V OO , under the TP-game always the case of a non-binding outside bid applies. That is, we always have w<½(V TP +vI)=½(V OO +w+vI). The estimated coefficients for the level of investment are of particular interest. In the OO-game when the outside bid is binding, the prediction is that the final agreed share makes the buyer residual claimant. This is apparently not the case, as the estimated coefficient for vI in the first row is below one. In the OO-game with a non-binding outside bid and in the TP-game the prediction is that the final agreed share gives the buyer half of the return to the investment. This is again not the case. In the second and third rows of Table 7, the coefficients for the level of investment exceed one half. Actually, pooled regression results reveal that the three coefficients for vI in Table 7 are not significantly different from each other.
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The above findings provide a partial explanation for buyers' observed investment behavior. Under the OO-game with a non-binding outside option and under the TP-game the final share the buyer gets gives her some incentive to invest more than the predicted level. Under the OO-game with a binding outside option the buyer has an incentive to invest less than the predicted level. Thus, when buyers base their investment decisions on finally accepted offers alone and ignore losses due to delay of agreement and the possibility of disagreement, investment levels under different outside bids would converge. This is exactly the pattern we observed in the previous subsection.
We next turn to describing the level of observed first and finally accepted offers themselves. An important reason why actual offers might differ from game-theoretical predictions is given by 19 For the OO-binding case we obtain a negative coefficient for I 2 with a p-value equal to .063. In the two other cases the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. 20 Note that formally the D-M-O and S-T-D predictions do not exactly apply for proposals made by the seller (cf. Subsection 3.2). 21 The coefficients for the outside wage differ between the TP-game and the two regimes of the OO-game. They do not differ between the two regimes of the OO-game. Only the coefficients for V in the TP-game and the OO-game with nonbinding outside wage are significantly different from each other. Other differences between the coefficients of V are not significant. considerations of fairness. 22 One of the main regularities obtained from a vast number of bargaining experiments is that first offers and final agreements typically deviate from equilibrium predictions in the direction of an equal split (cf. Bolton, 1991 , Ochs and Roth, 1989 , Roth, 1995b . This may point at a concern for fairness of the proposer. But it may also simply reflect proposers' strategic considerations in view of the anticipated reaction of responders.
Indeed, when the reaction of the responder is guided by the notion of being treated fairly, considerations of fairness may interact with the strategic features of the game (cf. Prasnikar and Roth, 1992) . To complicate matters further, what people perceive as being fair may strongly be influenced by the strategic situation they find themselves in. Binmore et al. (1991) , for instance, report that what subjects describe as being a fair bargaining outcome strongly depends on whether subjects played a bargaining game like our OO-game, or one like the TP-game. Based on a large number of experimental studies Roth (1995b, p. 328 ) more generally concludes that "…notions of fairness are labile and appear to respond to strategic considerations." Given the above problems, it may in general be rather difficult to disentangle strategic (game-theoretic) and fairness considerations. That will not be the purpose here. We just confine ourselves to reporting some descriptive statistics of the offers observed that are of interest from a fairness point of view.
Our next result compares actual offers in the different bargaining situations with the equal split outcome, and with each other. Evidence for Result 6 is provided in Table 8 below. The regression results reported in Tables 6 and 7 already revealed that first and finally accepted offers do not depend on the costs of investment I 2 , but do depend on the level of investment I. 23 Specifically, offers depend on the size of the actual (gross) surplus, which in turn is affected by the initial investment. Obviously, this also holds for the outcomes prescribed by equal split (ES), D-M-O and S-T-D. These dependencies makes a comprehensive presentation of the size of first and finally accepted offers somewhat problematic, because they typically relate to different outside bid/actual surplus combinations. In Table 8 we therefore present the information in condensed form, by reporting the mean of observed offers in relation to the means of the outcomes prescribed by ES, the 22 With game-theoretical predictions we mean here predictions solely based on strict income maximization. Of course, fairness considerations can directly enter game theoretical (equilibrium) predictions when agents are motivated by other goals as well. For instance, agents may have a preference for helping those other agents who are intentionally helping them, even when this bears some costs. Including this type of motivations may yield concepts like e.g. the "fairness equilibrium" notion introduced by Rabin (1993) . 23 The independence of I 2 can be interpreted as support for subgame perfection; investment costs are indeed seen as being sunk. 
-M-O S-T-D S-T-D D-M-O ES n

OO binding 490 660 571 285 0 2 119 3 0 0 1
Remark (for both tables): ES stands for equal split. Theoretical predictions are bold faced. In the OO binding situation it holds that S-T-D<D-M-O<ES, in the other two cases that S-T-D<D-M-O=ES. In the frequency distributions (next to last column) numbers straight below the predictions represent the number of observations that exactly equal this prediction. The numbers between them represent the number of observations that fall in between these predictions.
D-M-O prediction and the S-T-D prediction.
The table also gives the frequency distribution of the offers. First, consider the situation of the TP-game where the difference between the "fair" equal split division and the division predicted by subgame perfection is the largest. On average buyers start by proposing an almost equal split in the first bargaining round. (As already noted above, first offers are thus more in line with the D-M-O than with the appropriate S-T-D prediction.) But they finally end up with an amount that on average equals the middle between an equal split and the equilibrium share. Next consider the OO-game with a binding outside bid. Although for this situation the equilibrium prediction is strongly asymmetric in the sense that it gives the buyer substantially less than an equal split, buyers start off with asking even less than the predicted share (on average). Finally accepted offers deviate even further from an equal division. When the outside bid is not binding under the OO-game theory in fact predicts an equal split. There thus seems to be no conflict between strategic and fairness considerations in this case. Still, buyers' first offers give sellers substantially less than half of the gross surplus. But the finally accepted offers are on average indeed (almost) equal to an equal division. Table 8 reveals that absolute offers are larger under the TP-game than under the OOgame. This is largely a consequence of our experimental design that V TP =V OO +w, such that the base level of the surplus to be divided is larger under the TP-game. To make the offers comparable across the three different situations, one can focus on the relative share of the gross surplus V+vI that is offered. These relative shares immediately follow from Table 8 by computing the ratio mean offer/(2*mean ES). For the finally accepted offers, for instance, these ratios equal 0.42 for the TP-game and 0.37 (0.49) for the OO-game with a (non-)binding outside bid. 24 Recall that due to our design under the TP-game always the case of a non-binding outside bid applies. A clean comparison of relative shares between the TP-game and the OO-game with a binding outside bid is therefore not possible. With respect to the two comparisons that can be made we observe the following. In line with theoretical predictions relative shares (proposed in both first and finally accepted offers) are smaller under the TP-game than under the OO-game.
And, in the OO-game relative shares for the buyer are indeed larger when the outside bid is nonbinding. The relatively large difference between first and finally accepted offers observed for both the TP-game and the OO non-binding situation, together with the large dispersion in the actual offers, suggest that especially in these two situations the subjects differed considerably in their expectations about the terms of agreement (cf. Roth, 1995b, p. 307) . Our next result relates to this issue, by considering the seller's reaction to the first offer of the buyer.
Result 7: The percentage of first offer rejections is the largest under the TP-game and the smallest when the outside bid is binding under the OO-game. Disadvantageous counteroffers to the buyer's first offer occur more often under the OO-game than under the TP-game, but in all cases they are rather rare.
Result 7 follows immediately from Table 9 below. The sellers' overall responses to the first offers of the buyers provide a rough impression of the conflict of opinion about what constitutes a reasonable division of the surplus. In line with the observations obtained from Table 8 the acceptance rates under the three different bargaining situations suggest that conflict of opinion is relative low when the outside bid is binding in the OO-game. Probably, the strong and credible threat of the seller to opt out gives the buyer little leeway to disagree with him, and thus induces him to make a reasonable offer right away from the start (cf. Table 8a ).
The next to last column in Table 9 refers to the percentage of counteroffers by the seller that yield him less than acceptance of the buyers' first offer of the previous bargaining round would have done. Disadvantageous counteroffers are typically seen as a key indicator for fairness considerations also being part of subjects' utility functions. Besides simple pecuniary income, subjects may for instance also care about obtaining a fair relative share of the surplus (cf. Bolton, 1991) . Compared with the percentages observed for two period bargaining games (cf. Roth, 1995b) , the percentages of disadvantageous counteroffers observed here are rather low.
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The sellers' overall responses to buyers' first offers only provide a very crude measure of the conflict of opinion between the buyer and the seller about what constitutes a reasonable 24 The same relative shares are obtained when we (more accurately) first compute for each single observation the relative share the buyer obtains, and then take the mean over all observations. 25 Clearly, if we do not only consider first offers but take all offers into account, the percentages presented in Table 9 change. For instance, under the TP-game 63% (607) of all offers (963) are rejected, and 10% (60) of the 603 counteroffers are then directly disadvantageous (i.e. yield less than the offer rejected in the previous bargaining round). Buyers make more (39) directly disadvantageous counteroffers than sellers do (21). These overall data, however, are difficult to interpret, as offers made by an individual in later rounds are clearly not independent of offers in earlier rounds. Therefore, we only report the percentages for first period offers. Result 8 is based on the following measure of conflict of opinion. We compute the difference between the buyer's first offer and the offer made by the seller in the second bargaining round. Clearly, the latter is only observed in case of a rejection in the first round. When the buyer's first offer is accepted we simply set the difference between the two offers equal to zero, thus interpreting immediate acceptance as no conflict of opinion (at least not serious enough to trigger a costly dispute). In case the seller opts out in the first round of the OO-game we set the seller's offer in the second round equal to zero, i.e. equal to the amount the buyer obtains when the seller opts out. The difference between the first and second round offer then simply equals the buyer's first offer. To make conflict of opinion comparable between different surplus-outside bid combinations some form of scaling is required. The obvious scaling benchmark seems to be the actual (gross) surplus V+vI (actually, we use (V+vI)/10, because the offers always relate to the actual round pie (V+vI)/10). This benchmark is indeed used in the first column of Table 10 below. A potential disadvantage is that with this benchmark opting out does not necessarily lead to the same measured amount of conflict of opinion (it then depends on the size of the actual surplus). We therefore use the buyer's first offer itself as a second benchmark, such that a measure is obtained that lies between zero (no conflict) and one (maximal conflict)
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. Maximal conflict then always applies if the seller opts out in the first round.
For both the OO binding situation and the TP-game we do not find any significant differences when we compare, within the bargaining situation considered, the conflict of opinion across different outside bid levels. Table 10 therefore only reports the overall measures for these two situations. For the OO-game with a non-binding outside bid we do observe such differences. Conflict of opinion is then significantly lower when the outside bid equals w h . Comparisons between the three different situations are only based on the overall measures (i.e. based on all three values of w). 26 Except for one outlier where the seller offers the buyer more in the second bargaining round, for all observations the conflict of opinion is non-negative. From Table 10 we observe that conflict of opinion is relatively low in the OO binding situation, and relatively high under the TP-game. When the outside bid is non-binding in the OO-game conflict of opinion is decreasing in the value of the outside bid. Together with the fact that the low outside bid w l can never be binding, this suggests that it may be the low value of w rather than the fact that w is non-binding that drives a relatively high conflict of opinion under the OOgame. Indeed, this appears to be the case. Comparing for w=w m =6800 the OO binding situation with the non-binding situation, we find no significant differences between conflict of opinion according to a Mann-Whitney test (at the 10% level). Also for w=w h =7800 we find that conflict of opinion does not vary according to whether this outside bid is binding or not.
We next turn to the analysis of delay of agreement and the probability of disagreement. Besides the finally accepted offer, these aspects of the bargaining outcome crucially determine the buyer's actual return on her investment.
Our next result relates to delay of agreement and the probability of opting out. Result 9 follows immediately from Table 11 which reports the mean number of bargaining rounds before agreement is reached, or before the seller opts out. It also presents the number of cases that lead to the particular outcome.
27 Note that this table has a slightly different setup from the other tables appearing in this subsection. In particular, for the OO-game no distinction is Table 10 ). For both bargaining games we therefore report the mean of bargaining rounds conditional on the value of w. The theoretical prediction is that agreement is immediate, leading to mean numbers of bargaining rounds equal to 1. The averages in Table 11 are larger than 1. In the TP-game and in the OO-game with an outside bid equal to 1800, subjects need on average between 2 and 3 rounds to reach agreement. In the OO-game with high outside bids (6800 or 7800), opting out becomes relatively more attractive for the seller. The pressure to reach early agreement is then stronger, resulting in a significantly lower delay of agreement. This does not apply for the TPgame where opting out is not possible. There we do not find any significant differences when we compare the number of bargaining rounds across different outside bid levels.
In the OO-game subjects do have the possibility to opt out, but the equilibrium prediction is that they will not use this possibility. Opting out indeed appears to be rather rare.
We observe that in about 11% (39) of the cases the seller unilaterally quits the bargaining (buyers never chose to opt out in the experiment).
29 But opting out is much more likely when the outside bid equals w m or w h . It then occurs in about 15% of the cases, whereas for w=w l it occurs in less than 2% of the cases. These percentages appear to be independent of the outside bid being binding or not. Although Result 9 deviates from the particular equilibrium predictions that apply in our setting, it is line with the results obtained in other experimental studies. Ashenfelter et al. (1992) , for instance, study (unstructured) bargaining followed by binding arbitration in case of disagreement. They find that dispute (disagreement) rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes. These results accords well with our finding that under the OO-game delay of 28 Indeed, when we compare for w m =6800 the OO binding situation with the non-binding situation by means of a Mann-Whitney test, we find no significant differences between the number of bargaining rounds (at the 10% level). Also for w h =7800 it appears that the length of the bargaining game does not vary in the outside bid being binding or not. 29 Of the 20 sellers participating in the experiment, two never opted out, 11 only once, and three subjects only twice. The four remaining subjects opted out in respectively 3, 4, 7 and 8 periods. The last two individuals thus account for almost 40% of the opting out cases. agreement is decreasing in the value of the outside bid. Recall that our experimental setup is such that the joint costs of disagreement are independent of the value of w, irrespective of which bargaining game is played. 30 But under the OO-game the seller's private costs of delay are not.
The higher the value of the outside bid, the higher the value of the foregone opportunities of the seller. One round delay is therefore more costly to the seller when w is high, and therefore less likely to occur. A second result Ashenfelter et al. (1992) obtain is that dispute rates significantly differ across arbitration systems. Here we obtain a similar result that delay of agreement differs significantly across bargaining regimes.
As noted at the beginning of this subsection, our main goal in considering the bargaining outcomes of stage II is how they can explain the investment levels observed in stage I. With information about observed bargaining outcomes, we can try to calculate the investment level that can be considered optimal given actual bargaining behavior. A simple "back of the envelope" calculation can be based on Tables 7 and 11 . The first table gives the return on the investment according to the finally accepted offer, whereas the second one gives the mean number of rounds over which this return is actually collected. Based on these tables, and pooling the OO binding with the non-binding case, 31 we obtain that under the OO-game the "optimal" investments equal 32.4, 30,3 and 31,9 for w l , w m and w h respectively. Under the TP-game the "optimal" investment levels become 26.2, 27,5 and 27.8. These crude calculations thus suggest that on average buyers overinvest from a selfish point of view. However, when taking also the variance in observed bargaining outcomes into account this conclusion is unwarranted. Our last result summarizes this finding.
Result 10: Observed average investment levels (Table 5) are within one standard deviation of the investment levels that are optimal given actual bargaining outcomes.
We estimated regression equations with the buyers' payoffs as dependent variable, and the level of investment and investment squared as independent variables (besides a constant term). 32 The "optimum" level of investment then can be directly obtained from the estimated coefficients. 30 In both bargaining games the joint costs of one round delay equal (V OO +vI)/10. Forsythe et al. (1991) and Sopher (1990) experimentally test the joint cost theory of strikes. According to this theory the frequency of disagreement is negatively related to the joint (marginal) costs of a strike and positively related to the size of the surplus to be divided. Both hypotheses receive little support from the data, although strike frequency appears to be more sensitive to the pie size than to the marginal strike costs. In our setup the joint costs of one round delay can be interpreted as the joint marginal cost of striking. Note that the initial investment I affects both the size of the surplus and these marginal strike costs positively. In contrast to the experimental setup of Forsythe et al. (1991) and Sopher (1990) , we thus do not observe delay of agreement (strikes) under independent variations in the size of the surplus and the joint marginal cost of a strike. 31 When pooling these two cases, the estimated coefficient for vI in Table 7 becomes 0.766. Calculations are based on this estimate. 32 We have also estimated similar 'fixed effect' regression equations that incorporated subject-specific dummy variables (intercepts). In contrast to the standard regression results reported in the main text, these fixed effect regressions control for subject-specific characteristics. But the differences with the results obtained from the standard regressions are only minor. Therefore, we only report the latter. We also estimated a specification where the linear investment term has a spline at the predicted optimum. These splines were never significant. Table 12 reports on these "optimum" investment levels together with their standard deviations.
In all cases the number of observations equals 120. The table reveals that given actual bargaining outcomes under different bargaining games and outside bids, optimum investment levels are not very different from the actual investment levels reported in Table 5 . In all but one case, the average value of the observed investment levels in Table 5 is within one standard deviation of the "optimum" investment level. The exception occurs in the OO-game with an outside bid equal to 1800. Here buyers indeed overinvest relative to the payoffs they may expect from the actual bargaining outcome. One potential caveat applies when interpreting Result 10. The more imprecise the coefficient estimates used to calculate the optimal investment levels (i.e. the larger the standard deviations are in Table 12 ), the more likely it becomes that a result like Result 10 holds. The result can thus not be taken as evidence that investors are good optimizers after all. Rather, it suggests that the variance in observed bargaining outcomes is that large, such that it is of little help in determining the appropriate investment level.
To sum up, the results of this subsection show important deviations between actual bargaining behavior and predicted bargaining behavior. Subgame perfectness predicts that different bargaining situations lead to fairly different proposals and agreements, but that agreement is reached with the same speed (immediate). Our results clearly indicate the opposite. Proposals and agreements are much more similar than predicted (Results 4, 5 and 6), while we observe substantial differences in the speed with which agreement is reached (Results 7, 8, and 9) . Deviations between predicted and actual bargaining behavior and a large variation in actual bargaining outcomes explain why the optimum investment level (given actual bargaining behavior) are measured imprecisely (large standard deviations in Table 12 ). This in turn explains that observed investment levels are on average not very different from optimum investment levels (Result 10).
Conclusion
This paper reports about an experiment designed to test predictions based on the outside option principle. According to this principle holdup can be avoided by structuring the post-investment bargaining stage in such a way that the non-investing party has a binding outside option. The investor then becomes residual claimant and has the appropriate incentives to invest. Theory predicts that investments increase when non-investors' outside options increase from a non-binding low level to a binding high level. Investments in the latter case are then equal to the socially efficient level.
Theory also predicts that the outside option principle only applies when the noninvesting party's alternative opportunity has the form of an outside option, and not when it has the form of a threat point. In the latter case the investment level is predicted not to vary with the value of the threat point. The difference between outside options and threat points is, however, fairly subtle, and one might wonder whether individuals are able to grasp the essence of this difference.
In our experiment we find no support for the comparative statics predictions concerning the relationship between investment behavior and the outside option principle. In the outside option game, investors' investment levels do not increase with the value of non-investors' outside options. In the threat point game, on the other hand, investment levels tend to increase with the value of the threat point. Looking at absolute investment levels we conclude that holdup is less of a problem than theory predicts. Average investment levels are always below the socially efficient level, but are typically above the level predicted by subgame perfection. The only case where investors invest less than predicted by subgame perfectness is when it is predicted that there will be no underinvestment. These results cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of contractual solutions to the holdup problem that rely on the working of the outside option principle. Although we find no support for the relationship between investment behavior and the outside option principle, we do, however, find that investment levels are higher in outside option games than in threat point games. An explanation for this is that in outside option games there is typically less delay of agreement than in threat point games, so that a smaller part of the surplus created by the investment is wasted. Delay in the bargaining stage is not an issue in theoretical analyses of bargaining games with complete information, because subgame perfectness dictates that agreement is immediate. In practice, however, delay is not negligible, and earlier agreement can therefore be considered as an important advantage of outside option games over threat point games. A common sense explanation for the difference in delay is that the party who has no outside option will not play a hard bargain because of the threat that the other party opts out. (In this sense the threat of outside options is more serious than the threat of threat points.)
Although investment levels deviate from the theoretically predicted levels, we cannot conclude that investors invest suboptimally given actual bargaining behavior. When the noninvestor's outside payoffs are non-binding, the final bargaining outcome gives the investor more than the predicted half of the return on the investment. When the non-investor's outside payoffs are binding the final outcome gives the investor typically less than the predicted full return on the investment. This pattern of final outcomes give investors some incentive to overinvest when investment are predicted to be low and to underinvest when investment are predicted to be high. In line with this, we find that observed investment levels are within one standard deviation of the investment levels that are optimal given actual bargaining outcomes.
Appendices
A1
Derivation of the equilibrium investment levels reflected in Table 3 .
First consider equilibrium investment behavior when the TP-game applies. Using the expression for the employer's equilibrium share in Table 1 . This yields the first range distinguished in Table 3 . Next assume that max{w, αR(I;V)}=w. Then the maximization reduces to MAX I R(I;V)-C(I)-w, yielding immediately that I OO (w)=½v=Î. For this value of I OO the assumption max{w, αR(I;V)}=w requires that w≥α [V+½v 2 ]. This yields the third case. The single remaining case corresponds to the case where necessarily w= αR(I;V) for the optimal value of I
OO . In that case we directly obtain I OO (w)=(1/v)[(w/ α)-V] from this equality. The derivative of R(I;V)-max{w, αR(I;V)}-C(I) in this particular point does not exist, but the left and right derivatives do exist. The former equals v-2I, the latter equals v-αv-2I=(1-α)v-2I. Optimality requires the left derivative at I OO to be non-negative (for otherwise a small reduction in I OO would be profitable), and the right derivative to be non-positive. Thus, it is required that ½(1-α)v≤I Table 3 we have broken ranges over the border values of w arbitrarily.)
QED.
A2
Detailed comparative statics of investment behavior Table A2 below presents the detailed period-to-period comparative statics. The first column presents the transition that is considered, i.e. the jump from period j to j+1. The second column presents the levels of the outside bid in period j and j+1 (with L referring to w l etc.). The following columns present the number of investors that decreased (-), kept constant (0) or increased (+) their investment level, both for the OO-game and the TP-game. In these columns bold faced numbers refer to equilibrium predictions. The last two columns present the p-values of two statistical tests, comparing the OO-game with the TPgame. The first, Fisher's exact test, only considers the signs of the changes in investment levels. This test is completely based on the numbers appearing in the previous columns. The rank-sum test statistic in the last column also takes the (not reported) magnitudes of the observed changes into account. In both columns superscript * refers to a significant difference at the 10% level, superscript *** to a significant difference at the 1% level. In 5 of the 17 period-to-period transitions the outside bid actually stays exactly the same (cf. periods 3-4, 6-7, 9-10, 11-12, and 13-14) . So, for both bargaining treatments we should not observe changes in individual investment behavior. Observed comparative statics therefore should also not differ between the two bargaining games. Indeed, for all the five transitions where the outside bid stays the same no significant differences are observed between the period-to-period comparative statics of the OO-game and those of the TP-game (cf. the last two columns in Table A2 ). Theoretically we should observe significant differences between the OO-game and the TP-game for all remaining 12 (period-to-period) transitions. However, when we take the magnitude of observed changes into account we only observe two such differences (cf. rank-sum test, periods 1-2 and 2-3), when we do not only one significant difference remains (cf. Fischer's exact test, periods 2-3). Moreover, in both these cases the observed differences are in sharp contrast with the theoretical predictions. For instance, when going from w h to w l (transition 2-3) investors are more likely to increase their investment under the OO-game than under the TPgame, where it is predicted that they are less likely to do so.
The observed significant differences between the two treatments only concern the early periods (transitions). They may therefore be strongly guided by the fact that the subjects still have to learn how to play the game. From this perspective the observation that no significant differences are found in later rounds is probably more interesting.
